DESCRIPTION OF
SIGINT RELATIONS BETWEEN NSA AND GCHQ (U)
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I. INTRODUCTION

The following is a review of the NSA-GCHQ SIGINT relationship including an assessment of the present value of the exchange and identifiable problems. This review is intended to serve as a basis for determining our plans for the conduct of this relationship in the future, for any improvements/changes regarding control and accountability of the existing exchange, as well as developing proposals for additional contributions which should be made by each party. (U)

II. FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS

- There is a heavy flow of raw intercept, technical analytic results, and SIGINT product between NSA and GCHQ, to include direct distribution of product by each party to both country users. (S-GCE)

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

NOT REPLICABLE. T. LEIMAN

NSAFOIA Case 100386 Page 00380
III. BACKGROUND

- General

The SIGINT collaboration with the UK began in 1941 and was formalized in the UKUSA Agreement of 1946 (enclosed in Annex A). It has developed into one of virtually full partnership and interdependence, to include combined working parties, joint operations, the exchange of liaison and assignment of analysts to integrated posts. In addition, Divisions of Effort (DOE) and/or understandings between NSA and GCHQ are undertaken to respond to existing requirements. Each country makes unique contributions, and while the U.S. has moved far ahead in total resources committed and in technology development, the contribution of the UK continues to be of great value. *(TS-ECO)*

- UKUSA Agreement and Appendices

The UKUSA Agreement, dated 5 March 1946, has twelve short paragraphs and was so generally written that, with the exception of a few proper nouns, no changes to it have been made. It was signed by a UK representative of the London Signals Intelligence Board and the U.S. Senior Member of the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (a predecessor organization which evolved to be the present National Foreign Intelligence Board). The principles remain intact, allowing for a full and interdependent partnership. In effect, the basic agreement allows for the exchange of all COMINT results including end product and pertinent collateral data from each partner for targets worldwide, unless specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party. It also makes provision for restricting exchange of select materials when it is of special interest to either party, but notes that such exceptions should be kept to an absolute minimum. Over the years this has been the case. Additionally, the agreement makes provision for obtaining agreement between the two partners for COMINT relationships established with Third Parties and to ensure that materials received from such Third Party arrangements are made available to GCHQ and NSA. Provision was made to give special consideration to COMINT agencies of British Dominions (e.g., what are now Canada, Australia, New Zealand and to not consider them as Third Parties). Over the years numerous appendices have been added to cover specific areas of widening interest and ever-increasing sophistication. The Appendices to the UKUSA Agreement address such items as principles of security and dissemination, principles of relationships with Third Parties, standardization of intercept formats, common classification and categorization criteria,
exchange of material obtained through clandestine or covert sources, and principles of UKUSA collaboration with commonwealth countries. (A listing of each appendix with an explanatory comment is included as Annex B.) (TS/CC) 

- **Liaison**

  In accordance with Appendix I of the UKUSA Agreement, NSA and GCHQ maintain a liaison officer in each other's country to facilitate SIGINT collaboration. In the UK, the U.S. officer is the Special U.S. Liaison Officer, London (SUSLOL) and in Washington the UK officer is the Senior UK Liaison Officer, Washington, D.C. (SUKLOW). SUSLOL represents the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) as well as NSA in all SIGINT relationships with the UK.

  The liaison staffs for each center constitute qualified people who can liaise with the major key components of each agency as well as the major operational production groups, a cryptanalytic expert, and necessary administrative and communications support personnel. SUSLOL and SUKLOW and their respective staffs perform the official interaction between the two national centers, as well as provide SIGINT support to their national embassies.
Integrated Analysts

NSA and GCHQ have assigned cryptologic specialists into each other's HQ operational elements for purposes of combined operations on select target problems, expanding experience and training, and for contributing unique special talent or skill. This provides almost complete access to materials by these integrated analysts in the areas where they are assigned.

Combined Operations

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Other Areas of Combined Operations or Integrated Operations

The United States and UK have SIGINT personnel assigned to various select field sites of each other. These include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Number of People Assigned</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Exchange of Visitors

A great number of visits are exchanged between the National SIGINT HQ of each party representing various levels of personnel from the Directorate down. These visits take on different forms, e.g., analyst-to-analyst discussions, conferences, periodic meetings, management/planning reviews.
and consultations, Directorate level policy decisions.

- **Major Conference Exchanges**

  There are many conferences held between NSA and GCHQ which cover a multitude of topics. Most are held on an annual basis and usually alternate meeting places between the two centers. The more significant conferences include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Management &amp; Review</td>
<td>Senior Management participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Management Review</td>
<td>Senior Management (at Deputy Director level) participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- **Communications Tie-ins**

  Other than CRITICOMM and mail correspondence, GCHQ and NSA have various means for communications with each other. There are several OPSCOMM circuits between the two centers.

- **Computer Tie-ins/Accessibility**

  GCHQ has direct access to various NSA computer systems.

- **Technology Exchange**

  There is select technology exchange between both centers.
IV. VALUE OF RELATIONSHIP

- The value of this relationship is high and allows for a much fuller SIGINT effort than is possible with only U.S. resources. (S-CO)
- GCHQ is a contributor to our cryptanalytic efforts.
VI. AREAS OF COOPERATION/EXCHANGE

- The GCHQ-NSA SIGINT exchange involves a sharing of a wide variety of targets worldwide, ranging from military activities to terrorist activities, and it involves all facets of SIGINT, i.e., COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. This arrangement includes the exchange of material (raw intercept, analytic, product) on.

- There are many MOA's and MOU's between the partners; however, a significant amount of division of effort is accomplished without any formal MOA or MOU and has evolved through cooperation, engendered by personal contact and exchange. An understanding is created on each target of mutual interest in terms of collection, processing and reporting.
- See Annex C for a more specific description of the division of effort between the two parties. (U)
ANNEXES:

A UKUSA AGREEMENT OF 1946
B LISTING OF APPENDICES TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT
C DETAILS OF UKUSA DIVISION OF EFFORT
D PRINCIPAL UK CRYPTOLOGIC INSTALLATIONS
E U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC SITES IN THE UK
ANNEX A

BRITISH - U.S. COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT (§)

5 MARCH 1946

(UKUSA AGREEMENT)
BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

5 March 1946
OUTLINE OF
BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement
2. Scope of the Agreement
3. Extent of the Agreement - Products
4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques
5. Third Parties to the Agreement
6. The Dominions
7. Channels between U. S. and British Empire Agencies
8. Dissemination and Security
9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial
10. Previous Agreements
11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement
12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement
BRITISH-U. S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement

The following agreement is made between the State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) (representing the U. S. State, Navy, and War Departments and all other U. S. Communication Intelligence authorities which may function) and the London Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Board (representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, and all other British Empire Communication Intelligence authorities which may function).

2. Scope of the Agreement

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in Communication Intelligence matters only. However, the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will be effected between the Communication Intelligence agencies in both countries.

1 Throughout this agreement Communication Intelligence is understood to comprise all processes involved in the collection, production, and dissemination of information derived from the communications of other nations.

2 For the purposes of this agreement British Empire is understood to mean all British territory other than the Dominions.
3. **Extent of the Agreement - Products**

   (a) The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications:

   (1) collection of traffic
   
   (2) acquisition of communication documents and equipment
   
   (3) traffic analysis
   
   (4) cryptanalysis
   
   (5) decryption and translation
   
   (6) acquisition of information regarding communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment

3. Throughout this agreement foreign communications are understood to mean all communications of the government or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include commercial communications of a foreign country which may contain information of military, political, or economic value. Foreign country as used herein is understood to include any country, whether or not its government is recognized by the U. S. or the British Empire, excluding only the U. S., the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the British Empire.
(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.

4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques involved in the operations outlined in paragraph 3(a).

(b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken, except that upon notification of the other party information may be withheld by either party when its special interests so require. Such notification will include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient in the opinion of the withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum.

5. Third Parties to the Agreement

Both parties will regard this agreement as precluding action with third parties on any subject appertaining to Communication Intelligence except in accordance with the following understanding:

Throughout this agreement third parties are understood to mean all individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions.

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(a) It will be contrary to this agreement to reveal its existence to any third party whatever.

(b) Each party will seek the agreement of the other to any action with third parties, and will take no such action until its advisability is agreed upon.

(c) The agreement of the other having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.

(d) Each party will ensure that the results of any such action are made available to the other.

6. The Dominions

(a) While the Dominions are not parties to this agreement, they will not be regarded as third parties.

(b) The London SIGINT Board will, however, keep the U. S. informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with any Dominion agencies.

(c) STANCIB will make no arrangements with any Dominion agency other than Canadian except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.

(d) As regards Canada, STANCIB will complete no arrangements with any agency therein without first obtaining the views of the London SIGINT Board.

(e) It will be conditional on any Dominion agencies with whom collaboration takes place that
7. Channels Between U. S. and British Empire Agencies

(a) STANAG will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any British Empire agency except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.

(b) The London SIGINT Board will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any U. S. agency except through, or with the prior approval of, STANAG.

8. Dissemination and Security

Communication Intelligence and Secret or above technical matters connected therewith will be disseminated in accordance with identical security regulations to be drawn up and kept under review by STANAG and the London SIGINT Board in collaboration. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by either party will be made to U. S. recipients only as approved by STANAG; to British Empire recipients and to Dominion recipients other than Canadian only as approved by the London SIGINT Board; to Canadian recipients only as approved by either STANAG or the London SIGINT Board; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by STANAG and the London SIGINT Board.

9. Dissemination and Security - Commercial

STANAG and the London SIGINT Board will ensure that without prior notification and consent of the other party in each instance no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.
10. Previous Agreements

This agreement supersedes all previous agreements between British and U.S. authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement

This agreement may be amended or terminated completely or in part at any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party, should either consider its interests best served by such action.

12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

This agreement becomes effective by signature of duly authorized representatives of the London SIGINT Board and STANAG. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the Communication Intelligence authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the London SIGINT Board and STANAG.

For and in behalf of the London Signal Intelligence Board:

[Signature]

Patrick Harr-Johnson
Colonel, British Army
General Staff

For and in behalf of the State Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board:

[Signature]

Roy D. Veenenberg
Lieutenant General, CCC
Senior Member

5 March 1946
ANNEX B

A DESCRIPTION OF THE APPENDICES
TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT (S)
A DESCRIPTION

OF

THE APPENDICES TO THE UKUSA AGREEMENT
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UKUSA AGREEMENT APPLICATIONS THAT MAY BE AMENDED

APPENDIX A - TERMS TO BE USED

APPENDIX B - PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

APPENDIX C - EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL

APPENDIX D - COMMUNICATIONS

APPENDIX E - LIASION AND METHODS OF EXCHANGE

APPENDIX F - PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABORATION WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.K.

APPENDIX G - ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RE-LOCATION OF COMMIT UNITS

APPENDIX H - SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN SPECIFIED U.S. AND U.K. COMMIT UNITS

APPENDIX I - COMMUNICATION RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES AFFECTING UKUSA RELATIONSHIPS

APPENDIX J - ORGANIZATION OF U.S.-PRESIDENT COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION IN WAR

APPENDIX K - DESIGNATION OF INTERCEPT TARGETS

APPENDIX L - CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

APPENDIX M - CO-ORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON, CRYPTOANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

APPENDIX N - EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND Co-ORDINATION IN TRANSLATION

APPENDIX O - COLLABORATION IN THE UKUSA INTELLIGENCE PLAN TEXT FIELD

APPENDIX P - EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES, PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

APPENDIX Q - EXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL AND STANDARDIZATION OF RAW MATERIAL FORGE

NOTE: VIA COMSEC COMMUNICATIONS ONLY
INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDICES

A listing of arrangements which govern the collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. COMINT Agencies, including statements of exchange, liaison, standardization, allocation of resources, telecommunication, courier, review of Appendices.

APPENDIX A - TERMS TO BE USED

A definitive listing of terms placed in the context of the Agreement.

APPENDIX B - PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

Defines a number of terms peculiar to the SIGINT agreements; specifies the considerations for assigning COMINT to categories; establishes basic security principles governing collection, access, dissemination and transmission under all conditions of world climate.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B1 - THE ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES

This annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of sub-categories, (b) the assignment of COMINT to categories and sub-categories, (c) the classification of COMINT assigned to categories and sub-categories, and (d) the application of codewords to categories and sub-categories. It does not accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT, but along with the criteria described in Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance of current mutually agreed lists to indicate the precise assignment of all COMINT categories and sub-categories.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B2 - SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF COMINT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

This section defines exposed areas, risky situations, dangerous situations, and hazardous activities. It sets up safeguards for controlling the assignment of personnel to hazardous activities and provides safeguards for the conduct of COMINT operations in exposed areas or in risky or dangerous situations.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 - CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING OF INFORMATION RELATED TO COMINT OR COMINT ACTIVITIES

This annexure establishes minimum standards with respect to the handling and classification of information which is neither COMINT nor that contained in technical material or documents that reveal actual or prognosticated success or effort concerning the production of COMINT,
TOP SECRET

...jet reveals directly or by implication the existence or nature of COMINT or of COMINT activities.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 ANNEX A - TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN THE SAME PROTECTION AS COMINT

Lists the information which is neither COMINT nor "technical material" and which must be accorded the same protection of the classification and codeword of the highest category of COMINT to which it relates.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 ANNEX B - TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE HANDLED VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

This Annex prescribes the classification and handling procedures for information that does not require codeword protection, but which relates to COMINT or COMINT activities.

APPENDIX B ANNEXURE B3 ANNEX C - TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL SECURITY REGULATIONS

Discusses the types of information pertaining to COMINT which requires neither codeword protection nor the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" and will be classified and handled in accordance with U.S. or U.K. governmental security regulations in effect for information unconnected with COMINT or COMINT activities.

APPENDIX C - DESIGNATION OF INTERCEPT TARGETS

Outlines the JTA case numbering system for describing intercept targets in all fields other than International Commercial, for which a separate system is noted.

APPENDIX D - CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

Provides guidelines for the exchange of T/A materials and for coordination of intercept control to minimize duplication.

APPENDIX D ANNEXURE D1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1958 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX D

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

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APPENDIX E - COORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON,
CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

A statement of the principles governing coordination of, and
exchange of information on, cryptanalysis and associated techniques,
including standardization of system nomenclature, status of tasks,
allocation of tasks methods techniques and technical products, crypto
intelligence and transfer of devices and apparatus.

APPENDIX E APPENDIX H - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1948
CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX E

Consists of arrangements for informal allocation of cryptanalytic
tasks, short reference titling or system nomenclature, how to propose
a title and preparation of System Identification Sheets, preparation
of the Master File and preparation of the Quarterly Status Report.

APPENDIX E - EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION
IN TRANSLATION

Provides guidance as to standardization on format and content of
translations and for editorial comment on COMINT which is exchanged.

APPENDIX G - EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL AND COMINT MATERIAL
RELATING TO DESIGNS ON COVER OPERATIONS

Provides additional guidance beyond that in paragraphs 2 and 4
of the Agreement on the handling or exchange of collateral materials
and COMINT materials obtained clandestine or covert sources.

APPENDIX H - CONSTRUCTION

This offers general guidance as to telecommunications required,
installation, maintenance and operation of terminals, provision of
equipment, cryptographic aids, courier or bag routes, microfilm and
communications liaison.

APPENDIX H APPENDIX H1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1953
CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX H

Discusses the requirements for:

1. U.S. Stations and Units located or relocated in the U.K.
2. Communication arrangements for stations and units located or
   relocated in the U.K.
3. U.S. Stations abroad relocated to British controlled territory
   and British Stations abroad relocated to U.S. controlled territory.

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4. Trans-Atlantic Facilities
5. Trans-Pacific Facilities
6. Other combined communication nets and links (Existing and Planned)

APPENDIX I - LIASON AND METHODS OF EXCHANGE

Provides for liaison personnel, channels for requests on exchange of materials, and assistance to liaison personnel by the host country.

APPENDIX J - PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABORATION WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.K.

This appendix records the general principles governing UKUSA COBREGT collaboration with Commonwealth countries other than the U.K.

APPENDIX J ANNEXURE J1 - UKUSA ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Self-explanatory.

APPENDIX K - COLLABORATION P.L.E.R. PLAIN TEXT FIELD

Provides for guidelines on intercept priority, traffic exchange, product exchange and forecast of output based on plain text as

APPENDIX K ANNEXURE K1 - WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1948 CONFERENCE FOR THE LATER MODIFICATION OF APPENDIX K

Consists of exhibits to the appendix showing a specimen priority list, a specimen intercept record, a forecast of plain text reports, and other forms pertinent to Appendix K.

APPENDIX L - EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES, PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Provides for a comprehensive Annual Technical Report concerning (a) all intercept facilities installed and available for use at intercept and D/F stations whether or not such facilities are in use and (b) details of numbers and types and descriptions of intercept equipment under contract and/or in production, together with probable delivery dates.
This section sets up objectives and general principles of operation in making site surveys in the northern area (north of the 55th parallel).

Sets up procedures and a standard format for use in the exchange of raw material.

Consists of exhibits to the Appendix, showing formats or layout for various kinds of raw traffic.

This section describes conditions and situations under which emergency relocation of either or both U.S. and U.K. COMINT units is desirable and specifies the responsibilities of the several parties if such an event takes place.

Discusses responsibility for providing necessary equipment to the various units which might have to be relocated on an emergency basis.

A listing of the various U.S. and U.K. COMINT Units located on territory controlled by the other party.

Self-explanatory.
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APPENDIX C - ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN GCHQ; AIR
MINISTRY H.Q. RECEPTOR, CHANCE, AND THE U.S. LONDON SUBSTATION FORCES
(COMM H.Q.-LSC, CHELSEA)

Provides for liaison and exchange of personnel, coordination of
interception and exchange of intercepted traffic between the 10th RSJ
and Chelside and the 15th FCM and GCHQ.

APPENDIX D - CONFLICT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES AFFECTING UKUSA
RECEIPTURS

Basic principles governing COMINT arrangements by the U.K. and U.S.
with Third Parties.

APPENDIX P APPENDIX P1 - DEFINITIONS

Definitions of terms used in Appendix P.

APPENDIX P APPENDIX P2 - INTERNATIONAL COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALLIED
COMMAND EUROPE

A statement of principles governing the international, as
distinguished from the purely UKUSA, COMINT support to be provided to
the Allied Command Europe (ACE) in both peace and war.

APPENDIX P APPENDIX P3 - INTERNATIONAL COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALLIED
COMMAND ATLANTIC

A statement of principles governing the international, as distinguished
from the purely USBS, COMINT support to be provided to Allied Command
Atlantic (ACOTA) in both peace and war.

APPENDIX Q - COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL
COMINT CENTERS

A statement of principles to govern COMINT collaboration between the
U.S. and U.K. in case of war.

APPENDIX Q - COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL
COMINT CENTERS

This annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for implementation of
the principles of collaboration in a wartime situation and the formation
of the Combined Center Europe (CCE).
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Describes steps to be taken in the event of hostilities involving U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to ensure the greatest possible contribution to prosecuting the war consistent with security, including planned overseas National COMINT Centers.
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ANNEX C

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DETAILS OF UKUSA DIVISION OF EFFORT (6)

APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN CODEWORD MATERIAL

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ANNEX C

DETAILS OF UKUSA DIVISION OF EFFORT (U)
ANNEX D

PRINCIPAL UK CRYPTOLOGIC INSTALLATIONS - (G) -
U.K. SIGINT DEPLOYMENT

The U.K. SIGINT deployment has major concentration of resources and personnel at the following locations:
U.S. CRYPTOLOGIC SITES IN THE UK (S)